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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THF. STATE OF

UTA~

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Respondent,

-v-

Case No. 18255

RICHARD ALLEN BRADSHAW,
Defendant-Appellant.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
The appellant, Richard Allen Bradshaw, was charged
with producing a controlled substance, a third-degree felony,
in violation of Utah Code Ann.,§ 58-37-S(l)(a)(i)

(1953), as

amended, and with possession of a controlled substance, a
class B misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann., §
58-37-8(2)(a)(i)

(1953), as amended, and was tried before a

jury in the Fifth Judicial District Court for Beaver County,
the Honorable Robert F. Owens presiding.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The jury found appellant guilty of both counts, and
the trial court sentenced him to imprisonment in the Utah
State Prison for a period not to exceed five years.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent seeks affirmance of the appellant's
conviction.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
On October 7, 1980, responding to informant
information, Milford City Police Chief Richard Hannah and
Deputy Sheriff Dennis Cox drove to a residence adjacent to
appellant's home (Motion to Suppress Transcript 76, 77
hereinafter denoted ST).

Receiving permission to enter the

adjacent property, the officers discovered marijuana growing
on appellant's property near a three-foot retaining wall {ST
77, 81, 103).
Sheriff Cox then reached over the retaining wall and
plucked three leaves from a nearby marijuana plant {ST 81).
Based upon his observations, Chief Hannah executed a
search warrant affidavit whereupon Justice of the Peace H. C.
Cook issued a search warrant {ST 81, 90).
At

~:50

p.m. on the same day, Chief Hannah and

Officer Cox, along with other police officers, returned to
appellant's property to conduct a search pursuant to the
warrant {ST 83).

Finding no one at home, the officers

searched the surrounding property and found six marijuana
plants hidden from view by a colored plastic sheet
approximately twenty-four feet from the southwest corner of
appellant's easterly facing home {ST 84).

Two other plants

were found about twenty-six feet from the southeast corner of
the home {ST 85).

In a root cellar located behind appellant's

-2Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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home, the officers found 110 marijuana plants hidden from view
by a false well covered on top by window panes (ST 86).

All

marijuana plants seized by the officers were placed in black
plastic bags and transported to the Milford City Police
Department (ST 87, 88).
When appellant returned home later that evening,
Chief Hannah served him the search warrant (ST 125).

In the

search of appellant's home, the investigating officers found
marijuana stems, marijuana seeds, and ash residue from burned
marijuana (Trial transcript 103, 131 hereinafter denoted TT).
On the basis of this physical evidence, Sheriff Cox arrested
appellant (TT 147).

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE MARIJUANA TAKEN FROM APPELLANT'S
RESIDENCE AND PROPERTY WAS PROPERLY
ADMITTED AS EVIDENCE BY THE TRIAL COURT.
A.

EVIDENCE DISCOVERED UNDER THE SEARCH
WARRANT IS NOT FRUIT OF THE
POISONOUS TREE.

During the evidence suppression hearing, appellant
argued that the search warrant was based upon illegally seized
evidence--the three plucked marijuana leaves--and thus
derivative evidence seized under the search warrant was "fruit
of the poisonous tree" and therefore inadmissible.

The trial

-3-
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court excluded as evidence the three marijuana leaves, but
ruled, however, that the marijuana plants captured under the
search warrant were admissible.
On his appeal before this Court, appellant argues
that the marijuana plants seized under the search warrant
should have been excluded as evidence and the lower court's
failure to so rule constitutes reversible error.

The relevant

case law, however, belies appellant's claim and illuminates
his misconstruction of the "fruit of the poisonous tree"
doctrine.
The exclusionary rule of evidence was first
enunciated in Weeks v. United States, 232

u.s.

383 (1914),

wherein the Supreme Court held that evidence obtained by an
unlawful search and seizure was not admissible against an
accused in a federal court.

Later, the exclusionary rule was

held applicable to criminal prosecutions in state courts.
Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
The "fruit of the poisonous tree" doctrine, which
merely extended the Weeks exclusionary rule to derivative
evidence, was first articulated in Nardone v. United States,
308 U.S. 338 (1939).

Citing Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United

States, 251 U.S. 385 (1920), the precursor of the poisonous
tree doctrine, the Nardone Court stated:

-4-
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To forbid the direct use of metho<ls thus
characterized but to put no curb on their
full indirect use would only invite the
very methods deemed "inconsistent with
ethical standards and destructive of
personal liberty." What was said in a
different context in Silverthorne Lumber
Co. [251 U.S. at 392] • • • is oertinent
here:
"The essence of a provision
forbidding the acquisition of evidence in
a certain way is that not merely evidence
so acquired shall not be used before the
court, but that it shall not he used at
all."
308 U.S. at 340, 341.
A standard for determining whether proffered
evidence is fruit of the poisonous tree was articulated in
Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 487, 488 (1963),
quoting Maguire, Evidence of Guilt, 221 (1959):
We need not hold that all evidence is
"fruit of the poisonous tree" simply
because it would not have come to light
but for the illegal actions of the police.
Rather, the more apt question in such a
case is "whether, granting establishment
of the primary illegality, the evidence to
which instant objection is made has been
come at by exploitation of that illegality
or instead by means sufficiently
distinguishable to be purged of the
primary taint."
Thus, the efficacy of the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine
to any given case depends on whether there exists a sufficient
connection between the initial illegal search or seizure and
derivative evidence obtained therefrom.

-5-
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One type of insufficient connection between fruit
and tree occurs if derivative evidence has a source
independent of the prior, illegally seized objects.
Silverthorne Lumber Co., supra, 251 U.S. at 392.

This

exception to the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine is
explained further in People v. Eastman, 61 Cal. App. 3d 662,
132 Cal. Rptr. 510 (1976).

There, defendant was convicted of

selling heroin on the strength of the assistance and
information provided by two drug users.

The two users offered

their assistance to the police in exchange for a promise that
they would not be arrested for heroin possession.

The police

had discovered the heroin pursuant to an illegal search of the
user's home.

Following his conviction, the defendant appealed

arguing that the heroin evidence upon which his conviction was
based should have been suppressed because it was fruit of the
poisonous tree.

Construing the poisonous tree doctrine

articulated in Wong Sun, supra, the Fifth District Court of
Appeal stated:
[T]here must be • • • a connection between
the impropriety and the subsequent
transaction so that it can be said,
fairly, that the two transactions cannot
be treated separately.
In short, evidence
is not rendered inadmissible against a
defendant merely because there is a
relationship between the evidence and some
prior illegal police activity, if, for
example, the evidence was obtained by the
police as the result of an independent
intervening act. • • •

-6-

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

132 Cal. Rptr. at 514.

Applying this construction, the court

of appeal affirmed defendant's conviction holding that the
seizure of heroin which afforded the basis for his conviction
was sufficiently separate from the unlawful search of the
user's home, and thus the "fruit of the poisonous tree"
doctrine did not apply.
In the instant case, the poisonous tree doctrine is
similarly inapplicable.

As Officers Hannah and Cox stood by

the retaining wall, two separate, distinct and independent
events occurred:

first, both officers observed in open view

marijuana plants growing in appellant's property; and second,
following this observation, Sheriff Cox picked three leaves
from a nearby marijuana plant.

Based solely upon this

observation before the three leaves were picked, the officers
concluded that the plants growing on appellant's property were
marijuana (ST 77, 134).

That this conclusion was both

accurate ano reasonable is not for a moment in doubt.

Both

officers had had extensive training and much practical
experience in the identification of marijuana plants (ST 81;
TT 135).

Furthermore, the plants actually observed by the

officers were fully mature and located only three feet from
the retaining wall, and thus were easily identifiable (TT 135,
136).
More importantly, the search warrant affidavit was
founded solely upon the open view observation of marijuana
-7Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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growing in appellant's property, and it was not based, in
whole or in part, upon the subsequent seizure of the three
marijuana leaves (Trial Record, p. 95).

Thus, the search

warrant itself was independent of the seizure of the three
marijuana leaves; and as a corollary, all marijuana plants
seized under the search warrant were independent also.
Therefore, invoking Nardone and Wong Sun, supra, the marijuana
plants seized under the search warrant were not fruit of the
poisonous tree.
Appellant cites United States v. Paroutian, 299

F~2d

486 {2d Cir. 1962), as authority for his claim that the seized
marijuana plants represented fruit of the poisonous tree.
Paroutian, however, is distinguishable from the instant case.
There, in a warrantless search of defendant's apartment,
police officers uncovered heroin hydrochloride and a letter,
both of which were hidden in a secret compartment in a closet.
The heroin and the letter constituted the core of the
government's case.

Following his conviction, the defendant

appealed, contending, inter alia, that the lower court erred
when it failed to suppress critical evidence unearthed in the
unlawful search.
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the
defendant's conviction holding that evidence seized under the
unlawful search represented fruit of the poisonous tree.

-8-
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The court of appeals did recognize, however, the independent
source exception to the poisonous tree doctrine:
The unlawful search taints all
evidence obtained at the search or through
leads uncovered by the search. This rule,
however, extends only to facts which were
actually discovered by a process initiated
by the unlawful act.
If information which
could have emerged from an unlawful search
in fact stems from an independent source,
the evidence is admissihle.
Id. at 489 (emphasis added).
In Paroutian, damning evidence was actually
discovered by a process initiated by an unlawful act (the
illegal search); thus the evidence was fruit of the poisonous
tree and should have been suppressed.

In the case at bar,

however, the search warrant under which the marijuana plants
were seized was based solely upon informant information and an
open view observation--acts that were completely independent
of Sheriff Cox's seizure of the three marijuana leaves.
Therefore, the plants seized under the search warrant were not
tainted by the earlier seizure of the marijuana leaves.
Hence, the trial court properly denied appellant's motion to
suppress evidence obtained under the search warrant.
B.

THE POLICE OFFICERS' OPEN VIEW
OBSERVATION OF MARIJUANA LOCATED ON
APPELLANT'S PROPERTY IS NOT A FOURTH
AMENDMENT SEARCH.

Next, appellant argues that the officers' open view
observation of marijuana growing on his property constitutes

-9-
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an unreasonable search violating the Fourth Amendment.

In

addition, he contends that the plain view doctrine cannot
extricate this alleged unlawful search because the officers'
observation of the marijuana was not inadvertent, citing
Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971).
Reliance upon the plain view doctrine and Coolidge,
however, indicates appellant's confusion over basic Fourth
Amendment search and seizure doctrine as applied to the
instant case.

The plain view doctrine, as construea in

Coolidge, supra, applies when:
• . • the police officer • • • [has] a
prior justification for an intrusion in
the course of which he came inadvertently
across a piece of evidence incriminating
the accusea.
The doctrine serves to
supplement the prior justification-whether it be a warrant for another
object, hot pursuit, search incident to
lawful arrest, or some other legitimate
reason for being present unconnected with
a search directed against the accused--and
permits the warrantless seizure.
403 U.S. at 466.

Thus, the plain view doctrine articulates

circumstances in which evidence may be seized without a
warrant.
In the instant case, however, appellant's attack,
based upon Coolidge, is directed not at a seizure of evidence,
but at the police officers' observation of marijuana located
on appellant's property.

Thus, appellant employs the wrong
-10-
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case and wrong principle in constructing his Fourth Amendment
attack upon the officers' initial observation.

Furthermore,

plain view analysis presupposes a prior valid intrusion; i.e.,
hot pursuit, valid arrest, or a warrant authorizing a search
for objects other than those actually seized.

In the instant

case, however, there was no prior intrusion by the police
officers; thus, the Coolidge doctrine is not applicable.
While appellant's use of plain view is inappropriate
here, the open view doctrine associated with Katz v. United
States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967), is helpful in resolving his claim
that the officers' observation of marijuana represents an
unreasonable search proscribed by the Fourth Amendment.

In

Katz, the Supreme Court rejected any lingering notions that
search and seizure analysis was grounded in trespass doctrine
that presupposed a physical intrusion into constitutionally
protected areas:
For the Fourth Amendment protects people,
not places. What a person knowingly
exposes to the public, even in his own
home or office, is not a subject of Fourth
Amendment protection. But what he seeks
to preserve as private, even in an area
accessible to the public, may be
constitutionally protected.
Id. at 351, 352 [citations omitted].

The Katz standard

entails a two-part test:

-11-
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first that a person have exhibited an
actual (subjective) expectation of privacy
and, second, that the expectation be one
that society is prepared to recognize as
"reasonable."
Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).

Thus, if a police

officer's observations broach a defendant's reasonable
expectations of privacy, a search in the Fourth Amendment
sense has occurred, and further Fourth Amendment analysis then
addresses the reasonableness of that search.
Utah, 633 P.2d 48, 54 (1981)
See also:

(Maughan,

c.

State v. Lee,

J., dissenting).

State v. Kaaheena, 575 P.2d 462, 466 (Hawaii

1978).
The facts of the instant case clearly reveal that
appellant did not harbor a reasonable expectation of privacy
concerning the marijuana growing on his property.

Appellant

grew marijuana openly without protective covering within arm's
length of his neighbor's property.

Furthermore, the

investigating officers openly observed the marijuana without
any precedent efforts to uncover or reveal the plants, nor did
their observation require an intrusion upon appellant's
property.

Given such a bold enterprise conducted in broad

daylight next to a neighbor's property where appellant must
have known his efforts would be observed by others, there is
simply no support for the proposition that appellant even
harbored a subjective expectation of privacy, and it would
-12-
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require an even greater leap of faith to conclude that society
would deem such an expectation reasonable.

Because

appellant's brazen activities are not worthy of Katz
protection, the investigating officers' open view observation
did not constitute a Fourth Amendment search.
In addition, this Court's analysis in State v. Lee,
supra, further buttresses respondent's claim that a search <lid
not occur.

In Lee, the defendant was suspected of

burglarizing a mobile home sales park.

As the investigating

officer walked to the front door of defendant's home, he
noticed heavy equipment in a truck camper parked in the
driveway.

Shining a light through the camper window, the

officer noticed an arc welder and several tool boxes that had
been stolen earlier that evening.
Following his conviction, the defendant appealed
contending, inter alia, that the discovery of stolen equipment
in his truck constituted an unconstitutional search.
Rejecting this claim and affirming his conviction, this Court
held:
Thus, an officer is not expected to
ignore what is exposed to observation from
a position where he is lawfully entitled
to be. • • • That does not constitute a
"search" within the meaning of the
constitutional provisions.
633 P.2d at 51.

See also:

State v. Seagull, 95 Wash. 2d 898,

632 P.2d 44 (1981).
-13-
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Similarly, in the instant case, Officer Cox and
Chief Hannah could not be expected to ignore marijuana plainly
and openly exposed to observation, and viewed from a position
where the officers were lawfully entitled to be.

Thus, their

observation does not constitute a Fourth Amendment search.
Therefore, the trial court correctly denied appellant's motion
to suppress evidence seized under the warrant.
POINT II
THE REQUESTING OFFICER'S FAILURE TO SIGN
THE SEARCH WARRANT AFFIDAVIT DOES NOT
NULLIFY THE SEARCH WARRANT.
Following the observation of appellant's property
which revealed marijuana growing thereon, Chief Hannah
executed an affidavit upon which a search warrant was issued.
Altogether four or five warrant affidavits were executed by
Chief Hannah, but the one returned to the magistrate following
the search was not signed at the bottom, although it was
signed by him at the top following the words "The peace
officer undersigned, being sworn, states on oath" (Trial
Record, ST 120).

The other warrants not returned to the

magistrate were signed by Chief Hannah at the top and bottom
of the affidavit (Trial Record, ST 119-121).

Appellant

contends that Chief Hannah's failure to sign the returned
affidavit in the space immediately above the executing
magistrate nullified the search warrant.

-14-

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

In evaluating appellant's claim it is wise to
consider the Supreme Court's admonition against highly
technical objections to the completeness of a search warrant
and the affidavit in support thereof:
If the teachings of the Court's cases are
to be followed and the constitutional
policy served, affidavits for search
warrants, such as the one involved here,
must be tested and interpreted by
magistrates and courts in a common sense
and realistic fashion.
They are normally
drafted by nonlawyers in the midst and
haste of a criminal investigation.
Technical requirements of elaborate
specificity once enacted under common law
pleadings have no proper place in this
area.
United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102, 108 (1965).
this Court is faced with such an objection.

Here,

It is clear from

his testimony that Chief Hannah thought that he was properly
executing the affinavit hy signing at the top (ST 118, 119).
Furthermore, Chief Hannah did attach his signature, albeit at
the top, swearing an oath that the statements that followed
were true.

In addition, at least one of the search warrant

affidavits not returned to the magistrate was signed at both
the top and the bottom.
In People v. Gloss, 109 Cal. Rptr. 583, 34 Cal. App.
3d 74 (1973).

Appellant was charged with and convicted of

both the possession and sale of marijuana.

On appeal,

appellant argued that the search warrant was defective
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because a two-page statement of facts attached to the
supporting form affidavit had not been signed by the affiant.
Citing Ventresca, supra, the court of appeal rejected
appellant's claim and held that "[s]uch an extremely technical
and formalistic argument is inappropriate • • • • " and that
"the two-page attachment was obviously incorporated into the
affidavit."

109 Cal. Rptr. 58 7, 58 8.

Here, as there, appellant's formalistic argument is
equally inappropriate, and certainly Chief Hannah affixed his
signature with due regard to the requirements of his oath in
stating facts and circumstances known to be true.

Hence, the

affidavit was not defective, and the warrant was not
nullified.
POINT III
THE RESPONDENT LAID SUFFICIENT FOUNDATION
AT TRIAL FOR ADMISSION OF THE SEIZED
MARIJUANA AS PHYSICAL EVIDENCE.
The search of appellant's home and surrounding
property produced marijuana plants, stems and ash residue that
were placed in three plastic hags marked Trial Exhibits One,
Two and Three.

Following the search on October 7, 1980, the

three bags were transported to the Milford City Police Department (TT 107).

While at the station, Chief Hannah opened

Exhibit Three and removed a sample for testing, whereupon he
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resealed the exhibit ana then turned all three bags over to
Officer Clarence Hutchison, the property officer for the
Beaver County Sheriff's Department (TT 108, 198, 199).
Officer Hutchison then transportea the three sealed plastic
bags to the Beaver County Jail where he locked them in the
property room (TT 199).

There the bags remained until they

were summoned by the trial court (TT 199).
On November 16, 1980, Officer Hutchison entered the
property room and removed a sample from Exhibit Three which he
placed in a box that was later mailed to the Utah State Health
Laboratory for analysis (TT 200).

The sample removed by Chief

Hannah from Exhibit Three on October 7, 1980, was taken by him
to the State Health Laboratory in Salt Lake City, and turned
over to Mr. Bruce B. Beck, a toxicologist (TT 110, 177).

Mr.

Beck also received a sample from Officer Cox on October 10,
1980 (TT 179).
The samples received from Officers Cox and Hutchison
were positively identified by Mr. Beck as marijuana, while the
test results for Chief Hannah's sample were negative (TT 183,
184, 188).
On the first day of appellant's trial, November 9,
1981, respondent proffered as physical evidence Exhibits One,
Two, and Three, the three plastic bags of marijuana (TT 202).
Also proffered was a letter marked Exhibit Four that allegedly
accompanied a sample sent to the State Health Lab {TT 202).
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Appellant's objections to the admission of each of the four
exhibits were sustained by the trial court (TT 202, 203, 206,
207).
In an effort to provide additional· foundation for
Exhibit Four, Gary Cartwright, the Beaver County Sheriff, was
called to testify (TT 208).

Following his testimony,

respondent again proffered Exhibit Four which was received in
evidence over appellant's objection (TT 211).
At 6:40 p.m. on the first day of trial, respondent
moved the trial court for a continuance (TT 222).

The court

granted the motion over appellant's objection and continued·
the trial until Thursday, November 12, 1981 (TT 223).

The

court granted the motion to continue for two reasons:

The

lateness of the hour and the court's unanticipated rulings on
the evidence (TT 224).
On November 10, 1981, pursuant to a court order, the
court clerk removed the three bags of marijuana from the
clerk's vault and delivered them/ to Chief Hannah (TT 283-285).
Chief Hannah then delivered the three bags to Mr. Beck at the
State Health Lab located in Salt Lake City (TT 291).

In the

presence of Chief Hannah, Mr. Beck removed a sample from each
bag; he then analyzed each sample and concluded that the bags
contained marijuana (TT 262-264).

Following the analysis the

bags were resealed and returned to Chief Hannah (TT 292).

He

then returned the bags to the Milford Police evidence locker
where they remained until November 12, 1981 (TT 292).
-18Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

On the second day of trial, respondent again
proffered the three bags as evidence (TT 298).

The respondent

also proffered, as Exhibit Five, the sample removed by Officer
Hutchison which was sent to the Health Lab by Sheriff
Cartwright and later returned to Chief Hannah.

Chief Hannah

had placed the returned sample in the top drawer of his file
cabinet where it remained until the second day of trial (TT
229, 230, 288).

Based upon the officers' testimony and the

test results, Exhibits One, Two, Three and Four were received
as evidence.
Appellant contends that the marijuana seized
pursuant to the warrant was admitted without proper
foundation.

Specifically, he argues that respondent failed to

demonstrate a chain of possession that adequately links the
marijuana plants seized on appellant's property to those
plants actually admitted as evidence in court.
In State v. Madsen, 28 Utah 2d 108, 498 P.2d 670,
672 (1972), this Court held that before real evidence could be
admitted "there must be a showing that the proposed exhibit is
in substantially the same condition as at the time of the
crime."

The Madsen Court noted that chain of possession is

one factor, inter alia, that is relevant in assessing whether
real evidence has been altered.

498 P.2d at 672.

State v. Crook, 98 Idaho 383, 565 P.2d 576 (1977)

See also:
(proof of

chain of possession creates presumption that real evidence
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is not materially altered).

To admit the evidence, the trial

court must only be convinced that in all reasonable
probability the evidence is substantially unaltered.
supra, 565 P.2d at 577.

Crook,

As a corollary, the party proffering

the exhibit is not required to eliminate every conceivable
possibility that the evidence was altered.
582 S.W.2d 4 (Ark. 1979).

See also:

Inc., Utah, 578 P.2d 73 (1978)

Baughman v. State,

State v. Eagle Book,

(the trial court must be

satisfied that the proffered exhibit has not been altered,
then the court may, within its discretion, admit the exhibit).
Applying the aforementioned caselaw to the facts of
the instant case, the trial court properly admitted as real
evidence the marijuana plants seized on appellant's property.
The trial transcript indicates that a clear chain of
possession was established, and that the marijuana seized on
appellant's property was the same marijuana introduced at his
trial, without any material alteration.

The three bags of

marijuana were either in the possession of Chief Hannah,
locked in the Beaver County Jail property room, in the
possession of Mr. Beck, or locked in the court clerk's vault.
There is absolutely no gap, no missing link, in the chain of
possession of the marijuana from the time it was seized until
the time it was proffered to the trial court.

Furthermore,

the officials responsible for the marijuana testified that the
bags were properly marked for identification and always
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sealed.

Thus, respondent clearly established chain of

possession, and, within all reasonable probability,
established that no material alteration had occurred.
Therefore, the trial court properly adrnitten the bags
containing the seized marijuana.
As an addendum, citing Utah Code Ann., § 77-23-8
(1981) which states that an officer seizing contraband is
responsible for its safekeeping, appellant contends that the
chain of possession was broken when Chief Hannah turned the
bags of marijuana over to Officer Hutchison, the property
officer.

He also argues that the foregoing statute was

violated when samples taken from the bags were sent through
the mail to the Health Lab.

Thus, as construed by appellant,

§ 77-23-8 apparently required that Chief Hannah personally
maintain possession of the three bags twenty-four hours a day
until the trial began.
Appellant's construction is absurd, however.
Certainly, § 77-23-8 was only intended to place ultimate
responsibility on the seizing officer for the safekeeping of
seized property.

This does not mean that property officers

and lab technicians should be denied temporary possession of
seized property.

The record here indicates that Chief Hannah

acted responsibly in safeguarding the seized evidence, even
though other officers temporarily possessed the three bags in
discharging their duties.
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POINT IV
SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE WAS PRESENTED AT
APPELLANT'S TRIAL TO SUPPORT HIS
CONVICTION.
Appellant contends that although 119 marijuana
plants were found on his property, respondent failed to prove
that he was the one responsible for their growth and
cultivation.

He argues that the culprit could have been his

wife or other members of his extended family who visited his
home regularly.

Thus, as he contends, the evidence was

insufficient to prove his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
When faced with an insufficiency of evidence claim,
this Court has accorded great deference to conclusions reached
by the jury in matters solely within its province:
It is the exclusive function of the jury
to weigh the evidence and to determine the
credibility of the witnesses, and it is
not within the prerogative of this Court
to substitute its judgment for that of the
fact finder.
This Court should only
interfere when the evidence is so lacking
and insubstantial that reasonable men
could not possibly have reached a verdict
beyond a reasonable doubt.
State v. Lamm, Utah, 606 P.2d 229, 231 (1980).

Furthermore,

this Court has stated that its review of the evidence and
those inferences reasonably deduced therefrom will be
conducted in a light most favorable to the jury vernict.
State v. Kerekes, Utah, 622 P.2d 1161, 1168 (1980).

The
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Kerekes court also stated that the burden lies with the
defendant in demonstrating that the evidence was so
inconclusive or insubstantial that reasonable minds must have
entertained a reasonable doubt about his guilt.

Id. at 1168.

Actual physical possession of a controlled substance
is not necessary for a conviction since possession may be
inferred from other evidence:
Unlawful possession does not necessarily
mean that the substance be found on the
person of the accused or that he have sole
and exclusive possession thereof. All
that is necessary is that the accused have
constructive possession, where the
contraband is subject to his dominion and
control.
State v. Carlson, Utah, 635 P.2d 72, 74 (1981).

See also:

State v. Ellis, 207 S.E.2d 408, 413 (S.C. 1974).
In State v. Villavicencio, 108 Ariz. 518, 502 P.2d
1337 (1972), the defendant was convicted of possession of
heroin and marijuana.

The narcotics had been found on a porch

next to the back wall of the defendant's apartment, a location
readily accessible to other tenants.

On appeal, the defendant

contended, inter alia, that respondent failed to prove
possession.

Although noting that the location in which the

drugs were found was accessible to others, the Arizona Supreme
Court held that because of their location the drugs were under
the dominion and control of the defendant and thus
constructively possessed by him.

502 P.2d at 1339.
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In Landers v. State, 114 Ga. App. 687, 152 S.E.2d
431 (1966), the defendant appealed his narcotics conviction
contending, inter alia, that he co.uld not be deemed
constructively in possession of narcotics when his wife held
title to the home in which the contraband was found.
Rejecting this contention and affirming his conviction, the
Georgia Court of Appeals held:
Therefore, if legal title to the real
estate was in the wife, the defendant was
the head of the household and possession
of the narcotics was presumed to be his.
152 S.E.2d at 432.
Here, as in Villavicencio and Landers, supra, the
jury could reasonably infer that appellant constructively
possessed the marijuana plants because he exercised, by virtue
of ownership, control and dominion over the property on which
the plants were found.

Furthermore, this inference is not

rendered unreasonable merely because his friends, relatives,
and wife had access to the property.

Therefore, appellant has

failed to show that the evidence was so inconclusive or
insubstantial that reasonable minds must have entertained a
reasonable doubt about his guilt.

Thus, his conviction was

supported by sufficient evidence.
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POINT V
THE DEFENDANT WAS NOT PLACED IN DOUBLE
JEOPARDY.
Appellant's trial began on November 9, 1981.

.J\t

6:40 p.m. that evening, the trial court granted respondent's
motion for a continuance primarily because of the late hour,
but also because of the trial court's refusal to admit certain
real evinence (TT 224).

Appellant's trial was reconvened on

November 12, 1980, and concluded that morning.

Appellant

claims that this continuance placed him in double jeopardy.

A claim of double jeopardy presupposes that jeopardy
has first attached.

Jeopardy attaches when a "trial

terminates after the trier of fact resolved, or may have
resolved, the factual issues determinative of criminal
liability favorably to the defendant • • • • "

United States v.

Sanabria, 548 F.2d 1, 6 n. 6 (1st Cir. 1976)

(emphasis added).

In State ex rel. Fallis v. Vestrem, 527 P.2d 195
(Okla. Crim. App. 1974), the Oklahoma Court of Criminal
Appeals addressed an issue virtually identical to the issue
raised by appellant here.

There, following the presentation

of testimony, a dispute arose over the chain of possession of
the evidence.

The State requested a continuance to obtain

additional witnesses and the defendant objected.

Following

the trial court's grant of the continuance, the defendant
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filed a motion requesting the court to reconsider the
continuance.

The trial court dismissed the case but stayed

execution of the dismissal pending appellate review.

The

State appealed contending that the lower court erred when it
dismissed the case on the basis of former jeopardy.

The court

of criminal appeals held:
It is this Court's opinion a continuance
of this matter is not analogous to a
mistrial and does not raise an issue of
double jeopardy.
Id. at 197.
Similarly, in the instant case, there is no merit to
appellant's claim that the continuance placed him twice in
jeopardy.
POINT VI
THE SEARCH WARRANT SECURED BY CHIEF
HANNAH, A DE FACTO POLICE OFFICER, IS NOT
VOID.
On October 7, 1980, the date appellant's property
was searched and his marijuana seized, Chief Hannah had failed
to certify as a peace officer within eighteen months of his
original appointment as prescribed by Ut~ Code Ann., § 67-157 (1953), as amended.

Based upon this failure to certify,

appellant contends that Chief Hannah was without authority to
execute a search warrant.
-26-
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Although an officer may not be qualified by law, he
is cloaked with de facto authority when he has possession of
an office and discharges his outies under color of right.
Thompson v. Clatskanie Peoples P.U.D., 35 Or. App. 843, 583
P.2d 26, 28 (1978).

Accord:

468, 145 So.2d 1, 8 (1962).

Thibodeaux v. Comeaux, 243 La.
Furthermore, a de facto officer

is one who is recognized and accepted as the rightful holder
of the office by those who deal with him:

State v. Miller,

222 Kan. 405, 565 P.2d 228, 235 (1977); and the official acts
of a de facto officer should be given the same effect as those
of a de jure officer.

State Dental Council and Examining

Board v. Pollock, 318 A.2d 910 (Pa. 1974).
In the case at bar, Chief Hannah had uncontested
possession of the office of Chief of Police of Milford City.
Furthermore, he discharged his duties as an officer under
color of right.

Additionally, other police officers and

public officials, including Justice of the Peace H.

c.

Cook,

/

who issued the search warrant, recognized and accepted Chief
Hannah as the rightful holder of his office.

Therefore, Chief

Hannah, although not a de jure officer, was nonetheless
clothed with de facto authority and his acts and conduct
should be given the same effect.

Thus, the search warrant was

not void for want of proper authority in its execution.
In State v. Franks, 7 wash. App. 594, 501 P.2d 622
(1972), the Washington Court of Appeals addressed an issue
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virtually identical to the one raised by appellant here.

In

Franks, the defendant appealed his drug possession conviction
contending that a search warrant was invalid because it was
not issued by a qualified judge.

The facts revealed that the

judge was not in full compliance with the statutory conditions
required for his appointment.

Affirming the defendant's

conviction, the court of appeals held that the judge was
indeed a de facto officer and was qualified to issue the
contested search warrant.

501 P.2d at 623.

Here, as in Franks, supra, Chief Hannah was a de
facto officer and was properly qualified to execute the search
warrant which led to the seizure of appellant's marijuana.
POINT VII
APPELLANT WAS DENIED NEITHER A SPEEDY
TRIAL NOR TIMELY REPRESENTATION BY
COUNSEL.
Following his arrest, appellant was arraigned before
Justice of the Peace H. C. Cook on October 24, 1980 (ST 29).
During this hearing, Leo Kanell, a public defender, was
appointed as counsel for appellant (ST 30).

During the

preliminary hearing on November 13, 1980, appellant asked Mr.
Kanell to resign as his counsel because of alleged conflict of
interest (ST 36).

Appellant also indicated that he would earn

enough income over Christmas to proviae his own counsel.
hearing was then reset for December 12, 1980 (ST 38).
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The

The appellant failed to appear at the December 12,
1980 hearing and it was reset for some time in January, 1981
(ST 38)

(exact date not specified in the record).

At this

hearing appellant requested another public defender and Mr.
Cook informed him that Beaver County retained only one public
defender--Leo Kanell (ST 38).

Because Mr. Cook was not

authorized to provide another public defender, appellant
agreed to a transmittal of his case to the Circuit Court, with
a hearing scheduled for February 11, 1981 (ST 40).
On February 26, 1981, during an appearance by
appellant before Circuit Court Judge Ronnow, Mr. Scott Thorley
was appointed his counsel (ST 64).

Mr. Thorley resigned April

10, 1981 due to differences of opinion with appellant (ST 64).
Mr. Dexter Anderson was then appointed appellant's counsel on
April 15, 1981.

Appellant contends that these delays denied

him both a speedy trial and timely representation by counsel
in violation of Utah Code Ann.,§§ 77-32-1 and 77-35-7(4)(c)
(1953), as amended.
The facts in the record clearly indicate that both
claims lack merit.

Utah Code Ann.,§ 77-35-7(4)(c)

(1953), as

amended, provides in relevant part:
[The preliminary] examination shall be
held within a reasonable time, but in any
event not later than ten days if the
defendant is in custody for the defense
charged and not later than 30 days if he
is not in custody; provided however that
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these time periods may be extended by the
magistrate for good cause shown.
(emphasis added).

Each extension granted by the magistrate

was the result of appellant's failure to attend a hearing,
inability to provide his own counsel or inability to work with
appointed counsel.

In each case the magistrate was justified

in ordering a time extension for appellant's preliminary
hearing.
Furthermore, appellant's speedy trial claim lacks
merit because the delays were caused by his conduct.

State v.

Velasquez, Utah, 641 P.2d 115 (1982); State v. Dolack, 216
Kan. 622, 533 P.2d 1282 (1975).

In addition, appellant has

failed to show that the delays in his preliminary hearing
prejudiced him.

State v. Freeman, 599 P.2d 368 (Mont. 1979).

In sum, appellant was not denied his right to a
speedy trial, and the magistrate was justified in grainting
time extensions for his preliminary hearing.
CONCLUSION
Appellant's conviction was sufficiently supported by
evidence properly seized under a valid search warrant executed
by a peace officer possessing the requisite authority.
Furthermore, appellant was not denied either a speedy trial or
timely representation of counsel.

Therefore, respondent
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respectfully requests this Court affirm appellant's
conviction.
DATED this 24th day of August, 1982.

ROBERT N.
Assistant

General

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I mailed two true and exact
copies of the foregoing Brief, postage prepaid, to Dexter L.
Anderson, Attorney for Appellant, P.O. Box 566, 61 South Main,
Fillmore, Utah, 84631, this 24th day of August, 1982.
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